Effect of the league of nations on disarmament and peacekeeping

To whatextentwas the League of Nations successful in achieving its aims ofdisarmament and international peacekeeping?

Focus Questions:

• What was the structure and aims of the League of Nations?
• What did the League do to achieve these aims and what was the result?
• What lasting legacy has the League’s actions left on modern international relations?

The former president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, advocated the need in his Fourteen Points of 1918 for a League of Nations to restore world peace. Draft statutes of the League’s Covenant were formulated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where there was a mutual goal in international peacekeeping and disarmament. It was inaugurated on the 10th January 1920, simultaneously with the Treaty of Versailles. The organisation was mostly successful in its dealings in the 1920s, but historians argue that there are a number of causes which resulted in the League’s dissolving into the United Nations in 1945, including the ineffectiveness during specific disputes due to the self-interest of nations, and its poor administration with unclear authority and peacekeeping force. Despite this, the League was quite successful inexercising its own powerin resolving some conflicts and built the philosophy of internationalism for which the UN is built upon. Hence, there are many factors that must be considered in judging the extent of success of the League in achieving its aims, but it is the enduring impact that the League has left through the work of internal non-political agencies to enhance modern international relations that accentuate the organisation’s significance.

One of the factors that contributed to the League’s failure was its ineffectiveness during specific disputes. In particular, the Abyssinia crisis of 1935 was a key illustration of the reluctance from the major powers to act decisively in response to aggression. Fascist leader of Italy, Benito Mussolini, idealised a restoration of a Roman Empire, and justified his 1935 invasion of Abyssinia among other African states as he felt his people deserved a better life with more territory, which could not be achieved through the restrictions imposed by the League (Dennett & Dixon, 2008, p553). The League Council’s decision to impose economic sanctions on Italy was inadequate, as it did not restrict the use of oil, and the expansion regime of Mussolini that continued exemplifies a weakness of the League in appeasement exercised in an effort to deter nations from disturbing the peace, rather than forcefully enacting the articles of the Covenant and protecting the minorities who were more vulnerable to superior domination (United Nations, 2009). The reluctance of thepowers of Britainand France to challenge Mussolini may have resulted from their desire to retain him as an ally against Germany’s Hitler rather than to incite more violence and disorder, as the League was criticised for their sanctions and level of authority over these smaller states (Lowe, 1982). However, it was only when Mussolini forced Britain and France to war that the powers acted so that Ethiopia could finally reclaim their rightful territory and maintain self-governance (United Nations, 2009). Theoretically, the League should have responded by imposing forceful penalties on Italy to force their surrender of their regime, as Ethiopia was a member state, but the League’s own objective of collective security that it was built upon was outweighed by the interests of France and Britain in maintaining the Treaty of Versailles (Merriman, 1996, p1221). Thus a flaw in the League was exposed through this notion of collective security , that although there was a call to act against Italy, the consequences for the Powers hesitating to act had to be equally taken into consideration with the various possibilities of what could eventuate. For instance, supporting collective security could force Mussolini to join Hitler, yet the rise of Japan and Hitler to dominate Asia and Europe respectively was inevitable, but the humanitarian responsibility to prevent aggression was disregarded, the prime concern in global peace (Murray, 1948, p192). Traynor explains (1988) A. J. P. Taylor’s statement cited in The Origins of the Second World War of 1961 that the German movement into the Rhineland “ marked the end of the devices for security which had been set up after the First World War,” with the League “ a shadow,” as the Locarno Pact was destroyed and Germany was able to rebuild their army. The only possible solution to this would be sending in forces to retake control of Rhineland, as sanctions as previously seen were ineffective, and a nonchalant approach as seen here inspired Hitler to continue his regime (Traynor, 1988, p32). The Manchuria crisis of 1931 expresses a further reluctance to hold liable and impose restrictions on powers, as Japan continued conflict and failed to withdraw their invasion despite Chinese appeals (United Nations, 2009). The establishment of the Lytton Commission to investigate was meaningless as Japan eventually withdrew from the League, and invaded China again in 1937 (League of Nations, 1937), with no intervention from  Britain or France because a trade boycott would undoubtedly result in war and increase devastation in their own countries (Lowe, 1982, p143). Conflict intensified in 1937 with the Japanese invasion of China, and the League of Nations was asked to intervene with Ecuador’s delegate Quevedo arguing (1937), “ What hope can there be in similar cases in the future of help from the League of Nations for other weaker and less wealthy countries, in which other States do not stand to lose anything and have no special interests at stake?” The report delivered by the League’s Far East Advisory Committee to the Assembly condemned Japan’s occupation and promoted humanitarian support to China in restoring peace and independence (League of Nations, 1937), however as Japan was now a non-member, it had no overarching influence on them, and the Japanese Empire continued their aggression in their quest to dominate over Asia, taking over Hong Kong, Singapore and Indochina, and threatening the peace of Australia. Thus the League was seen somewhat as unsuccessful in achieving its aims due to the unclear methods of conflict resolution among powers that took into account the interest of all nations.

Further, another influence for the eventual disintegration of the League was the pooradministration of the League and the poor interest from members or non-members. For example, the non-participation of the United States despite the advocacy ofWilson is a major contributor, because of the American desire for anisolationist ideology away from conflict involvement, and the subsequentinability to obtain the full support of his own party to pass the vote throughthe majority of the Senate (Ostrower, 1996, p27). This was devastating to theLeague as the United States could have had a major influence in makingimportant military and economic decisions and perhaps been more forceful indelivering decisions regarding sanctions unlike that of Britain and France. This was evidenced through the Russian revolutionary belief maintained by Leninand Trotsky that “ peace must be made on a basis of no annexations and noindemnities,” (Walters, 1960). In this way, it supports how the League’sorganisation and lack of movement by the leaders exposed it to its fall due torelaxation in punishing offenders such as Hitler and Mussolini in order toappease them and prevent the inevitable war (Walters, 1960). Further, the restrictionof Germany’s and the USSR’s participation in the League until a later stage andtheir eventual withdrawal along with Japan is also important because ithighlights the overarching ideology of nationalism and sovereignty among thestronger nations. It was this dominance that suppressed the focus on peace andallowed the battlefront of warfare to initiate and take precedence over Europeand Asia. In addition, there were flaws in the Covenant itself whichcontradicted the purpose of collective security and prevented the League fromreaching its full potential in decision making (Lowe, 1982). The absence of asole-purpose peacekeeping force and the difficulty in reaching decisions unlessthere is a unanimous agreement among members was unacceptable, but the Covenantitself was difficult to amend due to the flaw in the voting process (Lowe, 1982). The Covenant was unrealistic in nations submitting to sacrificing theirindependence in making foreign policy decisions to an international body, wherethere was an undefined level of action to guarantee the safety of states, whichwould be difficult for developing states (Dennett & Dixon, 2008, p554). Forexample, Article 16 of the Covenant states that all members, when presentedwith conflict, are all responsible for imposing force against an aggressor, butan individual state would be incapable of challenging it, remaining vulnerableto attack due to the reluctance of other states to protect it; yet minoritiesthat are protected are still under threat due to the lack of force that wouldactually eventuate (Ostrower, 1996, p32). There was also a lack of commonbeliefs among nations regarding the notion of peace: Germany wanted to use theorganisation so that the terms of the Versailles Treaty could be altered to suittheir own interest, Britain wanted to eventually incorporate Germany back intoEurope, while the French wanted the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty andtheir military desires and Japan remaining generally uninterested (Ostrower, 1996, p115). This lack of consensus meant that Articles 10 to 16 of theCovenant were void due to the inability to reach common grounds of agreementbetween powers, and the ambiguous definition of authority within bodies of theLeague made it difficult for the Assembly to resolve disputes with highefficiency and the Council to be more influential in resolving Covenantcontraventions (Ostrower, 1996, p116). These flaws in the League were mostlynot in the control of the League itself, but through the influences of othernations, as it could not force the US to join, expect countries to give upsovereignty and sacrifice armies for collective security or please all theinterests of member nations, it would be an impossible feat as evidenced here(Ostrower, 1996, p117). Therefore, as a result of these factors, the League ofNations can be argued to have been somewhat unsuccessful.

On the contrary, one must acknowledge the various successes the League has had in itscontribution to a lasting legacy for modern international relations. One of thesuccesses of the League was in its work in the resolution of minor disputes. For example, the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian conflict almost intensified into war, butthe appeal of Bulgaria to the League for action allowed a consensus to bereached and for British, French and Italian forces to be deployed to enforcethe League’s order of an immediate ceasefire within 60 hours otherwise severesanctions would be imposed, which resulted in an end to the conflict (UnitedNations, 2009). This was a monumental decision for the League as the disputebetween two members of its own was suppressed with unique urgency by the powersto restore order and both parties allocated appropriate fault for theiractions, with Greece fined 45, 000 pounds for breaching the Covenant, andBulgaria ordered to pay compensation for the death of an opposing militant, andthe allocation of two officers who were responsible for settling furtherdisputes (Scott, 1973 p130). In addition, the League was able to resolvedisputes between Sweden and Finland regarding the Aaland Islands in 1920, andallowing the equal distribution of the Upper Silesia region between Germany andPoland in 1921 before further escalation (United Nations, 2009). Also, theLeague was successful in controlling the Saar territory for 15 years from itsformation, until the state obtained its right for self-governance in 1935, andthe maintenance of the Free City of Danzig with special harbour rights accessedby Poland (United Nations, 2009). As historian Francis Walters states, “ Nopower could claim to be exempt from public debate on its external actions andin this debate the smallest state had the same rights as the greatest,” andrevolutionised the idea of international relations after the Great War(Traynor, 1988, p20). Thus, it can be seen how effective management of disputeson a smaller scale allowed the League to flourish in the restoration of peaceand order.

Moreover, the League is seen to have been influential as it has shaped the philosophy ofinternationalism which defines the current work of the United Nations.

The League’s structural organisation wastransformed through the formation of the United Nations, and lessons learnedfrom the poor administration of it were acknowledged so improvements could bemade accordingly. For example, the League Assembly was an annual meeting fordiscussing issues concerning peace, altering the Covenant reform and electingnew members (United Nations, 2009), which then evolved into the correspondingUN General Assembly, a parliament of nations with equal votes and can only makeproposals to cases for Council consideration if enough support is received(Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p315). The League Council met 3 timesannually and were focused on taking measures to resolve conflict (UnitedNations, 2009), but was transformed into the UN Security Council with thesimilar goal of maintaining international peace and security, however decisionswere irrevocable, and the five permanent members had the power of veto toreject any proposal that was not in the best interest of all as they have themost influence in operations (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p313). TheLeague’s Permanent Secretariat worked as an administrator of internationalrelations in enacting treaties and investigating issues (United Nations, 2009), whose role is similarly performed by the UN’s Secretariat (Baylis, Owens &Smith, 2011, p315). The Permanent Court of International Justice was developedfor 15 judges to resolve and enforce any legal decisions regarding resolutionof conflict between nations and breach of international regulations (UnitedNations, 2009), which has evolved into the work of the International Court ofJustice in the Hague (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p316). The MandateCommission created regulations to allow the controlling and growth ofdeveloping nations under the power of developed states until they reached apoint of self-determination, such as Australia in control of New Guinea(Hudson, 1980, p133). This work continues in the UN’s Trusteeship Council whichassists this same process for a state moving to self-governance (Baylis, Owens& Smith, 2011, p316). Workers in the non-political agencies of the Leagueactively employed their expertise in making influential changes in the fieldsof economics, health, law, finance, communications, refugees, labour andinternational relations (Ostrower, 1996, p113). The Economic Committee wasresponsible for resolving financial issues and reducing tariffs post WWI, asseen in their provision of a £26 million loan to the Republic of Austria tostabilise the budget of the newly-formed nation; while the Communications andTransit Department explored issues concerning maritime, rail, roads, power andcommunications (United Nations, 2009). The World Health Organisation fordeveloping vaccines and preventing transmission of serious epidemics; theInternational Labour Organisation worked to improve working conditions forthose in the workforce; and a substantial amount of prisoners-of-war wererescued after European conflict by a League Commission (United Nations, 2009). These activities all highlight the organisation’s work towards a better worldfor humanity and their relations with those in other nations, which continuesto occur through the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in implementinginitiatives surrounding current global issues of human rights, health, urbanisation and refugees (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p316). In theseways, it can be seen how the work of the United Nations is a direct benefit ofthe underlying principles of the League of Nations.

One must also consider the important lessons that can be drawn from the League as theyhave allowed for the development of international relations and can provideinspiration for effective peacekeeping. The League was beneficial for Australiaitself as it notably advanced the nation’s involvement in internationalrelations and politics, growing in governing stature without any significantpressure by the British influence to act beyond its desired level ofinvolvement (Hudson, 1980, p186-7). For example, the League of Nations Unionspromoted social movements despite the loss of public support for the Leagueitself (Burgess, 2016), as leaders endeavoured to enhance public understandingof the League’s ideas, and build support to pressure the government in seekingpeace (International School History, 2011). Hence, the League was significantas the annual assemblies inspired the government to take decisive action onimportant policies, knowledgeable people became aware of the diversifiedAustralian foreign presence and of political circumstances in the surroundingworld so that they could pursue areas of concern (Hudson, 1980, p189). TheLeague allowed the development of Briand’s notion of a European Union to dealwith European affairs and promote free trade and movement within the region, which remains in prevalence today as a positive source of internationalcooperation (United Nations, 2009). The United Nations drew knowledge from theineffective League incorporation of treaties in policy, and developed theirCharter independent of agreements so that they could be successfully enforced, and the Security Council has a broader authority to consider the expertise ofall with interest in the conflict, rather than the League Council’s generalfocus on European matters (Goodrich, 1947). One can learn from the Corfu caseand the lack of power in Article 10 that if the Council came to a consensus andthe Powers were willing to resolve the dispute, there would be more confidencein the League and perhaps political circumstances in Europe may have beendifferent, rather than the existent avoidance of the Powers which led to thegradual weakening of power that it was unable to deal with a situation of themagnitude of the Rhineland  (Bassett, 1930, p374). What also can belearned from is the leadership of transitory Secretary-General Avenol incontrast to the strength of predecessor Drummond in his optimism and positiverelations with staff; Avenol’s political inexperience was evident and made himincompetent in making positive diplomatic decisions, only putting the patrioticinterest of France at the forefront of his agenda, which eventually led to hisvoluntary resignation (Gill, 1996, p108-9). As renowned League historianFrancis Walters explains was the greatest weakness of the League (1960), “ Theexperts did not want it. The peoples were enthusiastically behind it: …” (p16). He provides some further historical insight that when the Treaty of Versailleswas created, the international system was meant to prevent another Great Warfrom occurring, however the decision making and support of a League of Nationswas rushed into, without knowledge of effective international governance, meaning that “ their purposes were therefore liable to become uncertain andconfused” (Walters, 1960, p16). It was the lack of experience of the idea ofinternationalism at the time that prevented the League from effectively actingin times of hardship, but through the lessons learned of the League, the UN hascapitalised on the newfound understanding to work for a better world. Forexample, the United Nations was effective in their ability to deploypeacekeeping forces around the world, redevelop European relations anddefensive alliances, and provide initiatives for the arbitration of conflict, despite the US and USSR powers being at the forefront of the Cold War(Merriman, 1996, p1296). The UN experienced hardship through the post-WWIIpartitioning of Palestine, as well as in the Congo and Somalia operations(Townshend, 2011), however it has been realised that throughout history, anyinternational organisation will inevitably be threatened and face opposition, and it is the gradual work in protecting human rights with appropriate forceapplied in the specific circumstances which would generate desirable outcomes. In a modern world where technological advancements and imperialism have forcedglobalisation and the duality between independence and collaboration betweennations, resolution to conflict is essential in any form – arbitration, armistice after war, imposing embargo, international operations or memberinvolvement using “ all necessary means” to enforce decisions and maintain peace(Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p106). Conflict resolution and peacekeepingis critical, as an absence of order within one country can lead tointernational disorder (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p317), and allnations, especially those that are developed have the prime responsibility toact and protect global peace in an age of extreme terrorism and politicaluprising. Thus, it is the sense of internationalism which was virtuallynon-existent prior to 1919 that is taken for granted in the modern world, as itremains the underlying principle of existing legal and political systems formany countries and the source of international cooperation.

Therefore, it can be seen that through the analysis of a variety of factors the League of Nationscan be assessed in its effectiveness in achieving its predestined objectives ofinternational peacekeeping and disarmament. In one sense, the League is viewedby historians in its failure to reach a stage of global peace, as a result ofineffective resolution of disputes including Manchuria, Abyssinia and theRhineland, poor management of the League through ambiguous authority defined inthe Covenant and a lack of motivated involvement from countries within oroutside of the League. Alternatively, one must acknowledge these flaws andrecognise its various successes which cannot be underestimated in theirsignificance. Despite its limitations, the League effectively resolved somedisputes and generated a sense of internationalism which paved the way for theUN in shaping a better modern world, through the ongoing work of various agenciesthat were developed including the Permanent International Court of Justice, International Labour Organisation and World Health Organisation. Thus, it isthis foundation of cooperation between nations which the League has helped toestablish, that prevails as the answer to any question of dispute incontemporary society which threatens to disturb international peace and order.

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